Leakage-Resilient Anonymous Multi-Recipient Signcryption Under a Continual Leakage Model

Leakage-Resilient Anonymous Multi-Recipient Signcryption Under a Continual Leakage Model

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A multi-recipient signcryption (MRSC) scheme possesses the functionalities of both multi-recipient public-key encryption and digital signature to ensure both integrity and confidentiality of transmitted messages.Moreover, an anonymous MRSC (AMRSC) scheme retains the functionalities of an MRSC scheme while offering privacy-preserving, namely, a recipient’s identity or public hp 15-da0008ca key being hidden to other recipients.In the past, numerous MRSC and AMRSC schemes based on various public-key cryptographies (i.e., public key infrastructure (PKI)-based, identity (ID)-based and certificateless (CL)) were proposed.

Recently, an attacker can realize side-channel attacks to acquire partial bits of private keys participated in cryptographic computations.However, up to date, no MRSC or AMRSC scheme can resist side-channel attacks so that these schemes might suffer from such attacks and could be broken.To resist such oolution light up attacks under a continual leakage model, we propose the $first$ PKI-based leakage-resilient AMRSC (PKI-LR-AMRSC) scheme in this paper.In the proposed scheme, an attacker is permitted to continually acquire partial bits of private keys partook in computations of the PKI-LR-AMRSC scheme, and formal security proofs are given to show that the proposed scheme still retains the original security of AMRSC schemes.As compared with the relevant AMRSC schemes, our PKI-LR-AMRSC scheme not only resists side-channel attacks but also reduces the cost of executing the multi-signcryption and unsigncryption algorithms.

In particular, the point is that the computational complexities of our scheme respectively require only $O(t)$ and $O(1)$ in executing the Multi-signcryption algorithm and the Unsigncryption algorithm, where $t$ is the number of recipients.